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 In 1965 increasing American operations in Vietnam resulted in Operation Game Warden the creation of Task Force 116 ( a so called brown water navy ) in order to deny Viet Cong access to the resources in the Mekong Delta .

Among the air units withiin TF116 were Heavy Attack Squadron 21 ( VAH-21 Roadrunners ) flying gunships AP-2H Neptunes, Light Attack Squadron Four ( VAL-4 Black Ponies ) flying 18 OV-10A Broncos borrowed from the USMC and Helicopter Attack (Light) Squadron Three ( HAL-3 Seawolves ).

In March 1966 when operations begun and the promised helicopter squadron wasn’t created yet, TF116 used men and UH-1B Hueys from US Army 145th Combat Aviation Battalion (197th Aviation Co)
In June 1966, navy pilots from Helicopter Combat Support Squadron One (HC-1 at the time flying UH-2 Seasprites for the pacific fleet aircraft carriers ) joined TF116 and began the transition to the Huey taking over the missions from the Army by September.
HAL-3 was formally created April 1st, 1967 at Vung Tau and up to nine detachments will be created until the squadron is finally disbanded on January 1972.
From the beginning their helicopters not only operated from land bases but also from support ships: USS Belle Grove (LSD-2), USS Comstock (LSD-19), USS Tortuga (LSD-26), USS Floyd County (LST-762), and USS Jennings County (LST-846).
From 1970 , USS Garrett County (LST-786), USS Harnett County (LST-821) and USS Hunterdon County (LST-838), were reassigned to the AGP role (patrol craft / boat tender) .

Among the helicopters used by HAL-3 were Army UH-1B/C/M Huey variants, Marines UH-1E and Navy HH-1K and UH-1L

When the first 10 PBRs arrived in Vietnam on 21 March, the Belle Grove assumed the duty of mother ship for the new arrivals. After Operation Jackstay terminated on 4 April, the Army gunships remained aboard the Belle Grove to continue development of PBR gunship tactics preparatory to the PBRs first operational mission the next week. Assigned to the Navy's newly activated Task Force 116, or operation Gamewarden, the first patrol was mounted on 10 April 1966 as 2 PBRs of River Squadron Five began operations along the Long Tau River. The Belle Grove was relieved of its duties to TF-116 on 19 April by the USS Tortuga (LSD-26).

This arrangement of Army air crews flying in support of naval operations from Navy ships caused difficulties which both services were quick to discover. Even though the Army pioneered the armed helicopter concept and developed much of its tactics, they did not have experience in supporting naval riverine operations. While that experience could undoubtedly have been gained over a period of time, it was felt naval aviators trained in gunship operations would more quickly and readily adapt to the mission requirements.

Part of this was the necessity to operate at night in bad weather from the deck of a ship. The PBRs worked around the clock in all weather conditions so it was highly desirable their air support would be available then as well. At this point in time, Army gunships were not equipped for and their pilots not skilled in all weather helicopter flying, particularly from a floating deck. In many cases, the Army would not accept missions in marginal weather, especially at night. Flying in the dark of night in bad weather or without good horizontal definition is a sticky proposition and more than one Army helicopter was lost under these conditions. It was believed that Navy helicopter pilots, skilled at antisubmarine warfare and search and rescue operations which required a similar all weather capability, would be better able to cope with this environment than their Army counterparts.

Also, a dedicated Navy air unit committed directly to the Gamewarden mission could provide a relatively stable source of air support that would not require careful inter-service coordination to assure availability. Direct Naval air support for the PBRs was viewed as the solution for existing and anticipated problems of command, control and availability.

Tortuga shifted to the Mekong Delta region on 12 June to serve as a floating base for the Navy's fast PBR's of TF 116 and for a detachment of Army Bell UH-1B Huey helicopter gunships. The PBR's, attached to River Patrol Squadron 512, were small yet relatively heavily armed craft. Each mounted a .50-caliber machine gun forward and an "over-and-under" combination mount of one .50-caliber machine gun mounted over an 81-millimeter mortar aft. The helicopters, too, were relatively heavily armed, packing a "punch" of rockets of varying sizes and up to six machine guns. Initially, the helicopters were Army "choppers" from the 145th Aviation Detachment. However, by the end of Tortuga's tour, they were Navy aircraft from Task Force "Sea Wolf." Together, the PBR's and Hueys conducted their patrols and forays into the verdant jungle waterways; the PBR's knifing through the muddy sandy-colored waterways while the helicopters flew close cover above.

Occasionally, the hard-hitting teams would strike "pay-dirt," by capturing enemy munitions. On one occasion, on 12 June at the mouth of the Co Chien River, Tortuga's PBR's participated in the capture of a large stock of guns and munitions captured from a damaged communist trawler which had been forced aground and set afire.

During her support operations with the riverine assault groups, Tortuga received a number of distinguished visitors ranging from General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, Military Assistance Group; Rear Admiral N. G. Ward, Commanding Naval Forces, Vietnam; as well as United States Ambassador to South Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge; and news commentator Chet Huntley, who brought with him an NBC camera team to record a news story on Tortuga's river patrol base activities.

When the ship was at anchor In Vung Tau, Vietnam, members of the crew went on liberty many times.  The crew was transported from the ship to Customs House Pier for liberty.

With a population of about 40,000, Vung Tau offered an interesting but somewhat limited selection of shopping opportunities.  The Army and Navy have provided a variety of service clubs whose recreation facilities were open to us.

USS Tortuga (LSD-26)

Western Pacific Cruise Book

1 March through 7 November 1966

It was common for USS Tortuga crewmembers in their time off to accompany members assigned to the ship of the PBR (Patrol Boat River) and Army & Navy Huey Helicopter on patrols (mail & “milk runs”).  This was to break the boredom of ship living.   During tours of Vietnam, we were highly mobile, moving about the countryside in secure areas on liberty, time off, and duty. Tracking a single individual for every day of their tour is extraordinarily difficult.  We were ashore (in country) in all of the Four Corps areas of Vietnam.  Most of our time was in the” III Corps area, which received the heaviest concentration of spraying of Agent Orange”.

http://www.lewispublishing.com/map1.htm

http://www.usvetdsp.com/agentorange.htm

Because of the going ashore, traveling in country, and working near shore we (shipmates on the Tortuga LSD-26) were routinely given orange anti-malaria tablets as medication aboard ship when in Vietnam.

United States Naval Operations Vietnam, Highlights; (No. 7) April 1966

River Patrol Force

Operation GAME WARDEN entered its fledgling stages during April as the first PBRs became operational and patrolled the waters of the Rung Sat Special Zone. As the new crews received area indoctrination and training, construction of new bases in the Mekong Delta area continued in preparation for the arrival of the first patrol units during the forthcoming months.

The departure of the Seventh Fleet Marine Amphibious Force from the Rung Sat Special Zone on 7 April signaled the termination of Operation JACKSTAY. Highly successful in terms of equipment and facilities captured or destroyed, JACKSTAY also resulted in 63 Viet Cong killed. But the likelihood was great that Viet Cong forces in the area would attempt to re-infiltrate into the Rung Sat Special Zone and establish once again their secure bases.

To counter this possibility by denying the Viet Cong use of the major waterways in the Rung Sat Special Zone, the CTF 115 river patrols established during JACKSTAY were maintained after completion of the operation. The ten patrol stations were to be manned by five WPBs and four PCFs. Two LCPLs, the UH-1B fire teams, and the MSBs were to assist. The PBRs were scheduled to phase in when operationally ready. Vietnamese Navy assistance was also requested. On 6 April, the units chopped to operational control of CTG 116.2, and commenced patrol.

On 8 April, Vietnamese Navy units relieved two stations, freeing one WPB and one PCF for MARKET TIME patrol. River Assault Group units, consisting of one commandament, one FOM (similar to STCAN), and one monitor, assumed patrols on the upper Soirap River. Other VNN units patrolled the eastern reach of the Vamco River and the Dong Tranh River. On 8 April, the PBRs of River Patrol Section 541 commenced orientation patrols with PCFs and WPBs on the Long Tau River stations. On 15 April, the PBRs reported they were ready to assume any two stations. On the following day, the PBRs commenced patrol, resulting in two PCFs and two WPBs released for MARKET TIME operations. This resulted in seven stations manned continually by United States units: two by PBRs, three by WPBs and two by PCFs. PBRs occupied one additional station vacated by Vietnamese Navy units on 16 April.

The Soirap River patrol stations continued to meet with success as the Viet Cong persisted in their attempts to utilize this waterway. On 17 April, PCF 23 illuminated a contact attempting to cross the Soirap River just north of the Vain Sat River mouth. The sampan maintained speed and opened fire with small arms. Four people in the sampan jumped overboard as PCF 23 returned the fire. The sampan was taken in tow but subsequently sank. Enemy shore fire prevented a continued search of the area.

The effectiveness of the Soirap River patrols can also be measured in terms of the stepped-up harassment of patrol units. On numerous occasions during the month, the boats came under moderate to heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the banks, Most of the harassing fire was received in the section near the mouth of the Vain Sat River, a known infiltration route terminal and the scene of considerable action during March and April. Shore fire was also received on two occasions near the mouth of the Soirap River.

Meanwhile the Long Tau River patrol stations continued relatively quiet. Intelligence reports during the month indicated a partial shift in Viet Cong infiltration patterns into the Rung Sat Special Zone, with traffic entering from the east, originating in Viet Cong strongholds in Phuoc Tuy Province. However, no evidence of this was uncovered by the Long Tau River patrols. One reason for this may exist in the fact that the Long Thu River, with its narrow, sinuous channel, presents a much more difficult patrol area than the wide, straight Soirap River. With the exception of the wide section near the mouth of Ganh Rai Bay, transit across the Long Tau can be accomplished quickly, making detection difficult.

On 26 April, an additional twelve PBRs arrived at Cat Lo. These units commenced shakedown cruises from the base at Cat Lo and from USS Floyd County (LST-762), which had arrived in country on 12 April to become the second Inshore Support ship. River Division 51 was activated on 27 April aboard USS Tortuga (LSD-26) in preparation for the first transit into the Mekong Delta in May. The new units were designated River Section 512.

While crew performance during the initial month of PBR operations was regarded as excellent, numerous problem areas arose in the boats themselves. The narrow vinyl beading which served as a fender was not adequate protection when boarding and searching larger junks, or when alongside a support ship. This resulted in damage to the side. To correct this, discarded helicopter tires were obtained for use as fenders. Armor plating around the forward gun mount has been removed on all boats to improve gunner and coxswain visibility and communications. M-72s, one-time-only anti tank rockets, are being carried on all boats as interim ordnance pending approval and installation of the Mark 18, 40 mm rapid fire grenade launcher. In another ordnance improvement, .50 caliber machine guns are being installed

June 12, 1966

Hunting VC on the Waterways
Black’s in the Delta Navy, Choppers Teaming Up To Patrol Viet Nam Rivers
 

(EDITOR'S NOTE:  Charles Black, the Ledger-Enquirer’s man in Viet Nam, has spent most of his time there writing about the Army. For a change of pace, Black now moves into a new phase of his war corresponding career:  He’s writing about the Navy.  Staring today and continuing this week in The Ledger and The Enquirer he writes about Operation Sea Wolf.)


 

By CHARLES BLACK

Ledger-Enquirer Staff Writer

VUNG TAU - About the first week of May the Pentagon began talking publicly about a concept of river warfare aimed at accomplishing a mission in places such as the Mekong Delta area of South Viet Nam, 14,250 square miles of manmade flood zone where rice paddies, canals and rivers form a confusing network of obstacles to surface travel.

The new concept was essentially a U.S. Marine Corp idea.  It envisioned the use of river patrol boats, helicopter reactions teams flying from ship platforms, a ship as home operations base, and specialized teams of surface troops to control the banks and the tributary entries into main streams.

As is usually the case, at about the time the Washington “concept” talk was going on, the U.S.S.Tortuga was relieving the U.S.S. Belle Grove, which actually started the operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone, in conjunction with some spanking new Navy river patrol boats  (RPBs) and two pairs of armed helicopters drawn from the various companies of the 145th Aviation Battalion.

Helicopters, boats and men can control an area where river and canal traffic is the primary method of transportation, as in the Mekong Delta or the Rung Sat zone.

Sound Idea

The idea is sound, even though a lot of the details are still to be worked out before the new methods become really effective. 

I spent nine days on the U.S.S. Tortuga, anchored a mile or so from Vung Tao and cut off from everything except the tight little universe of the men engaged in the operation.

Each night I flew with a helicopter crew on patrols of the rivers or in answer to calls from the river patrol boats when they received fire from the banks of the waterways in their patrol areas.

Sometime I would mix up this schedule with a daylight run in the choppers.  I made a wearying and spooky 14-hour patrol with one of the little fiber glass RPMs.  They carry a four man crew and are just off the drafting boards.  They have a future which may be quite exciting for the sailors aboard.


Risky and Costly

It was costly in time and it got risky now and again, but as the pattern of the operation became more familiar each day, the problems began to be identifiable and it is in this area that the new idea for river warfare must meet its toughest test.

The Viet Cong won’t really be able to cope with it if it is properly developed and used.  If it doesn’t work, it will be because human and mechanical problems of a friendly nature keep it from doing so.
First, the area involved.

The Rung Sat Special Zone is a sector running from the bay here at Vung Tao, where the Saigon River empties, to near Saigon and it looks as if it were designed by hobgoblins for the entertainment of alligators and cottonmouth moccasins.


Muddy and Swampy

It is muddy, full of mangrove swamps, cut by twisting little channels through the major marshes.  Some areas have heavy tree growth and there are limited zones around villages where the land isn’t partially underwater.

Canals, creeks, and the multi-coursed channels of the rivers winding in almost table flat terrain (except for occasional humps and hummocks) provide a Vietnamese boater’s paradise.

The Viet Cong have used this area as a secure base and a way station, as an area to store supplies being transported to other areas.  Sampans ply almost every inch of the waterways.

The people in this area are fishermen and woodcutters who have legitimate business back in the dismal swamp stretches and along the canals.  The whole mode of life is centered on water - the sea and the rivers - and sampans.


Split Kind of Warfare

Americans patrolling the rivers have many new things to learn in this split-personality kind of warfare.  Somehow they have to check all suspicious traffic, attempt to stop Viet Cong from intermingling with legitimate sampan movement and do it in a manner which doesn’t make enemies.
A Coast Guard Swift boat which was on such a patrol recently had an experience which illustrates the problem beautifully.

The crew on the 82-foot patrol boat saw a big sampan sailing briskly for an isolated village and overhaul it.

The two Vietnamese were awed by all of the weapons the boat and its crew carried and there was always a language problem, but one thing was very clear, the sampan was in trouble.  It was practically awash with water.


Pump Boat Dry

The Coastguardsmen hurriedly threw a pump into action and had the boat pumped dry in a few minutes.

The Vietnamese advisor each of these Coast Guard boats carries for such problems was not available just then, but when he came back aboard the crew told him what had happened.
He then told them what had really happened.

The sampan was hauling fresh water to the village.  Most of the settlements can’t get water to drink in their area and depend on sampans which sell loads of stuff from upstream (the river is salt near the sea) and the rescue operation had just about cancelled a week’s work for the sampan crew.


Solution Presented

Somebody came up with the solution to how to stop VC from using the channels, however and this is the basic idea as it was being used in the Rung Sat Special Zone in its first test.

The boats have now moved to the more stringent problem of the Mekong area now and the concept will become operational, but the test was based on these considerations:

1.    A curfew would be placed on river traffic, all legitimate boatmen would travel only at day and tie up in specified anchorage at night.

2.    Certain areas of the zone, known Viet Cong-controlled areas, would be taboo for legitimate traffic at any time.  Any boat in those areas would be fired on as a Viet Cong transport.

Daytime-Controlled Traffic

3.    Daytime traffic would be easily controlled and checked by the RPB crews.  Their new boats draw only a few inches of water.  The fiberglass hulls are unsinkable.

The new engines, a twin jet of water pumped by big diesels, were quieter than most boats.  Tests had indicated a speed of 25 knots.  They would carry three .50 caliber machine guns, two forward and one aft, and the crew would have M-16 rifles and M-79 grenade launchers with an M-60 machine gun which could be moved as needed.

4.    Because the high banks - especially at low tide - would give advantage to snipers and ambushers, even more protection would be necessary.  Helicopter gunships would provide this by being on 24-hour alert, flying from an LSD and an LST fitted up with flight decks.

Call in Boatmen

5.    The helicopters would fly armed reconnaissance along the river areas as well as be on call to assist the RPB crewmen.


Because the entire Sea Wolf project was part of a continuing operations called “Game Warden” they might be called on to shoot for patrolling troops in the area and to support special Navy units, called SEAL teams (Sea Air Land Teams) composed of underwater demolitions team specialists organized into ambush squads.

The idea for using shallow draft boats and boat-landed ambush squads and patrols is not new.  The French did it, Americans have been doing it.

The broad scope of traffic control and the application of armed helicopters is new.  Missing is a helicopter reaction force which could bring troop units in a hurry, something the original concept and something which became obviously desirable as indicated by the facts of the days spent with Sea Wolf pack.

In fact, the problems to be solved became very simple to list and documented themselves with events.

United States Naval Operations Vietnam, Highlights; (No. 9) June 1966

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